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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 74, USWU, IUJAT, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASENO.CU-6010 
OUR LADY OF LOURDES HIGH SCHOOL, 
Employer, 
-and-
LAY FACULTY ASSOCIATION, LIUNA, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor/lncumbent. 
O'DWYER & BERNSTEIN, LLP (ANDREW GRABOIS, ESQ., of counsel) for 
Petitioner 
SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP (JAMES HAYS, ESQ., of 
counsel) for Employer 
ARCHER, BYINGTON, GLENNON & LEVINE LLP (JAMES VERSOCKI, ESQ., 
of counsel), for Intervenor/lncumbent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On September 3, 2010, the Local 74, USWU, IUJAT (Petitioner) filed a timely 
petition seeking to be certified as the exclusive negotiating representative for 
employees in the following unit, currently represented by the Lay Faculty Association, 
LINUA, AFL-CIO (Intervenor/lncumbent): 
Included: Full and Regular Part-time Lay Faculty Members (including 
librarians and counselors). 
Excluded: All clerical, supervisory and religious employees. 
Upon the consent of the parties, a mail ballot election was held on July 10, 2012 
concerning whether employees in the unit wanted to be represented by Petitioner, 
Intervenor/lncumbent or neither. The results of this election show that the majority of 
eligible employees in the unit who cast valid ballots no longer desire to be represented 
for purposes of collective negotiations.1'' 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the petition seeking certification by 
Petitioner should be, and it hereby is, dismissed; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Intervenor/lncumbent be, and it hereby is, 
decertified as the negotiating agent for the unit. 
DATED: August 6, 2012, 
Albany, New York 
1
 Of the 37 ballots cast, 23 were against representation, 11 were for representation by 
Petitioner and 3 were for continued representation by Intervenor/lncumbent. There 
were no challenged ballots. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, • 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-6068 
INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF ROCKVILLE 
CENTRE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-6068 - 2 -
Included: The Account Clerk in the Comptroller's Office who supervises Tax 
Assessment and the Senior Account Clerk in the Comptroller's 
Office who supervises Utilities Accounting and all employees in the 
titles of Inspector of Street Maintenance, Motor Repair Supervisor, 
Electric Engineer-Utilities, Deputy Superintendent of Public Works, 
Recreation Specialist, Housing Coordinator, Power Plant 
Maintenance Supervisor, Community Youth Group Worker, Senior 
Citizen Program Development Specialist, Assistant Superintendent-
Power Plant, Purchasing Agent, Information Technology Specialist 
I, Programmer/Computer Operator, Safety Coordinator and Deputy 
Superintendent of Electric Utilities. 
Excluded: All other Account Clerks and Senior Account Clerks and all other 
employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 6, 2012 
Albany, New York • _ 
n 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In. the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-6115 
VALLEY STREAM CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
LOCAL 74, UNITED SERVICE WORKERS 
UNION, IUJAT, 
Intervenor/lncumbent. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Certification - C-6115 - 2 -
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All permanent, full-time and part-time members of the custodial, 
grounds and maintenance staff of the Valley Stream Central High 
School District, including but not limited to the following job titles: 
Assistant Head Custodian, Cleaner, Custodian/Groundskeeper, 
Plumbing and Electrical Maintenance Mechanic, Skilled Maintainer, 
Building Attendant and Messenger (CHSD). 
Excluded: Seasonal and casual employees and all others not set forth above. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 6, 2012 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefk#witz, Chairman 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
II 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JOHN S. BURKE CATHOLIC HIGH SCHOOL, 
Employer/Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. CE-6128 
LAY FACULTY ASSOCIATION, 
Union. 
SHEPPARD, MULLIN, RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP (JAMES HAYS, ESQ., of 
counsel) for Employer 
ARCHER, BYINGTON, GLENNON & LEVINE LLP (JAMES VERSOCKI, ESQ., 
of counsel), for Intervenor/lncumbent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On April 6, 2012, the John S. Burke Catholic High School (petitioner) filed a 
timely petition for decertification of the Lay Faculty Association (union), the current 
negotiating representative for employees in the following unit: 
Included: Full and regular part-time Lay Faculty Members (including librarians 
and counselors). 
Excluded: All clerical, supervisory and professional and religious employees. 
Upon consent of the parties, a mail ballot election was held on June 4, 2012. 
The results of this election show that the majority of eligible employees in the unit who 
cast valid ballots no longer desire to be represented for purposes of collective 
Case No. CE-6128 page 2 
negotiations by the.union.-
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the union be, and it hereby is, decertified as 
the negotiating agent for the unit. 
DATED: August 6, 2012, 
Albany, New York, New York 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
- Of the 31 ballots cast, 4 were for representation and 9 against representation. 
There were no challenged ballots. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SHEFFIELD TULLOCH, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASENO.U-31040 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2, 
AFT,, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
- and-
 ; 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
i 
Employer. 
SHEFFIELD TULLOCH, pro se 
RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE, GENERAL COUNSEL (WENDY M. STAR of 
counsel), for Respondent 
DAVID BRODSKY, ESQ., DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF LABOR RELATIONS AND 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (ALLISON S. BILLER of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
. This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Sheffield Tulloch (Tulloch), 
to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing an improper practice 
charge, as amended, filed by Tulloch against the United Federation of Teachers, Local 
2, AFT, AFL-CIO (UFT) alleging that UFT violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act).1 The ALJ dismissed the charge on the ground that it is 
untimely pursuant to §204.1 (a)(1) of the Rules of Procedure (Rules). 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On May 10, 2011, Tulloch filed the charge alleging that UFT violated the Act 
when it failed to respond to his inquiries concerning his salary and refused to process a 
grievance. Tulloch'specifically alleged in the charge that he has "been attempting to 
obtain Union representation on this issue for approximately 2 years now."2 Following a 
preliminary review of the charge pursuant to §204.2(a) of the Rules, the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) notified Tulloch that the 
charge is untimely. The Director, however, granted Tulloch an opportunity to amend his 
allegations, in response, Tulloch filed an amended charge alleging that he filed a 
complaint with UFT in March 2011 concerning back wages and that UFT refuses to 
process his complaint. Thereafter, UFT and the District filed answers asserting, inter 
alia, that the amended charge is untimely. 
During the hearing before the ALJ, Tulloch testified that following his 
reinstatement in 2003, UFT failed to respond to his inquiry concerning his salary, and 
refused to file a grievance. According to Tulloch, UFT did not respond to his salary 
inquiry in 2006, and refused to file a grievance in 2007.3 Tulloch emphasized: "That is 
'45 PERB ^4556 (2012). The Board of Education of the City School District of the City 
of New York (District) is a statutory party pursuant to §209-a(3) of the Act. 
2
 ALJ Exhibit 1. 
3
 Transcript, pp. 7-9, 12-14. In light of Tulloch's testimony, we reject the assertion in his 
exceptions that he did not request UFT to file a grievance until 2011. 
the basis of this hearing, this whole issue, this case."4 During his narrative testimony, 
the District objected, on relevancy grounds, to Tulloch testifying about purported 
mistreatment by the District.5 At the conclusion of Tulloch's case, UFT and the District 
made oral motions to dismiss the amended charge as untimely.6 The ALJ adjourned 
the hearing to provide the parties with an opportunity to submit briefs regarding the 
motions by UFT and the District. After Tulloch, UFT and the District filed their 
respective briefs, the ALJ issued a decision dated April 26, 2012, dismissing the charge. 
Following issuance of the decision, Tulloch complained to the ALJ that he had not been 
notified of the number of copies he needed to serve on the other parties, he had not 
received UFT's post-hearing brief, and UFT failed to respond to his discovery requests 
during the processing of the charge. On May 4, 201.2, the ALJ responded with a letter 
explaining that the case before him was closed following issuance of the decision. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In his exceptions, Tulloch does not challenge the ALJ's conclusion that his 
amended charge is untimely. Instead, his exceptions focus on purported procedural 
errors, factual mistakes and alleged bias by the ALJ. UFT and the District support the 
ALJ's decision. Following our carefuPreview of the record, and the arguments of the 
parties, we affirm the ALJ's decision, as modified. 
4
 Transcript, p. 10. Tulloch also testified to UFT's failure to pursue another grievance in 
2004. Transcript, pp. 18-20. 
5
 Transcript, pp. 21-24. 
6
 Transcript, pp. 25-26. 
DISCUSSION. 
Pursuant to §212.5 of the Rules, a party submitting a brief to an ALJ is required 
to file an original and three copies. Contrary to Tulloch's exceptions, the failure of the 
. ALJ to explicitly inform him of that requirement does not constitute, reversal error. There 
is nothing in the record to demonstrate that the charge was dismissed because Tulloch 
did not file or serve a sufficient number of copies of his post-hearing brief. 
Tulloch's claim that the ALJ failed to order UFT to comply with his discovery 
demand does not constitute a procedural error or demonstrate unfairness. While 
voluntary pre-hearing exchange of documents between the parties is important in 
expediting the administrative process, our Rules do not mandate pre-hearing disclosure. 
The record also does not support Tulloch's claim that the ALJ demonstrated 
partiality toward UFT. At the hearing, the ALJ permitted Tulloch to testify in a narrative 
form and he was provided with an opportunity to articulate the relevant facts to support 
his claim against UFT. Tulloch testified that the UFT conduct which forms the basis for 
his charge occurred in 2006 and 2007. His testimony supports the affirmative defenses 
raised by UFT and the District in their respective answers that the charge is untimely. 
While Tulloch claims that the ALJ denied him an opportunity to testify with 
respect to certain unidentified documents, the transcript reveals that he requested 
permission to "get something," and little else.7 The ALJ did not expressly deny his 
request. Moreover, we are unable to discern from the transcript whether Tulloch was 
referencing documents, and if he was, whether those documents were relevant to the 
timeliness of the charge. 
7
 Transcript, pp. 24-25. 
The fact that the ALJ asked at the conclusion of Tulloch's testimony whether UFT 
intended to make a motion does not demonstrate bias or unfairness in the 
administrative process. A motion to dismiss at the conclusion of a charging party's case 
is a common procedure, and the ALJ's question cannot be reasonably construed as 
suggesting that UFT make such a motion.8 
Finally, we grant, in part, Tulloch exceptions claiming that the ALJ made 
misstatements in his decision and in his subsequent letter. Tulloch filed his charge in 
2011, and not 2010 as stated in- the ALJ's decision. In addition, the record does not 
support the ALJ's statement in his May 4, 2012 letter that Tulloch was already aware of 
the issuance of the decision. These minor misstatements, however, are not bases for 
reversing the ALJ's decision 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Tulloch's exceptions are denied, in part, . 
and granted, in part, and the ALJ's decision is affirmed as modified. 
DATED: August 6, 2012 
Albany, New York 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
8
 We also reject Tulloch's claim that the circumstances surrounding the ALJ's grant of an 
extension of time for UFT to file its brief demonstrates partiality by the ALJ. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SHELTER ISLAND FACULTY ASSOCIATION, 
NYSUT, AFT, NEA, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-30525 
- and -
SHELTER ISLAND UNION FREE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
JONATHAN D. RUBIN,"LABOR RELATIONS SPECIALIST, NYSUT, for 
Charging Party 
INGERMAN SMITH, L.L.P. (CHRISTOPHER VENATOR of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Shelter Island Faculty 
Association, NYSUT, AFT, NEA, AFL-CIO (Association) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing the Association's improper practice charge, 
which alleges that the Shelter Island Union Free School District (District) violated §209-
a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
discontinued a past practice of compensating a unit member for attending quarterly 
Board of Trustees meetings of the East End Health Plan (Health Plan) without charging 
accumulated leave under the parties' collectively negotiated agreement (agreement). 
The ALJ dismissed the charge, sustaining the District's related affirmative defenses of 
Case No. U-30525 -2 
contract reversion and duty satisfaction.1 
The case was submitted to the ALJ on a stipulated record, which has aided in an 
expedited final resolution of the issues raised by .the parties. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the Association asserts that the ALJ erred in concluding that 
the District met its burden of demonstrating its contract reversion and duty satisfaction 
defenses based upon the personal leave provision in Article XVII(B) of the agreement 
The Association also claims that the ALJ erred in concluding that a unit member's 
attendance as a trustee at the quarterly meetings of the Health Plan's Board of 
Trustees is personal in nature. Finally, the Association excepts to the ALJ's purported 
conclusion that the unit member may have been eligible to utilize union leave to attend 
Board of Trustees' meetings. The District supports the ALJ's decision. 
Following our review of the record, we reverse the ALJ's decision, and conclude 
that the District violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act when it discontinued the past practice of 
compensating an Association unit member, who is a trustee of the Health Plan, for 
attending quarterly Board of Trustees' meetings without charging accumulated leave 
under the parties'agreement. 
FACTS 
Article XVII of the parties' agreement is entitled "Teacher Leaves." It includes 
provisions concerning a variety of specifically defined paid leaves for Association unit 
members: jury duty; subpoenaed attendance to testify before a tribunal concerning 
litigation; sick leave; personal leave; professional days; child care leave; sabbatical 
^-x Case No. U-30525 
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leave; and bereavement leave.2 
Article XVII(B) is the sick and personal leave provision, which states in relevant 
SICK LEAVE/PERSONAL LEAVE 
Each full-time teacher shall be entitled to 15 sick days per annum and 2 
personal days per annum (said sick days to accumulate annually). The 
leave days shall be for the following purposes including medical 
treatment. 
1. Sickness 
2. Personal Business 
(Personal business is defined as an activity which 
cannot be accomplished on a non-working day or 
during non-working hours.) 
3. Medical Treatment 
(Medial treatment is defined as an activity which 
cannot be accomplished on a non-working day 
or during non-working hours). 
Requests for personal leave days should be made at least three (3) days 
in advance, except in cases of emergency. The Superintendent shall 
request specific reasons for any personal leave in excess of two days per 
year and may grant these at his/her discretion. 
Both unused personal and sick leave may accumulate to a maximum of 
two hundred (200) days.3 
The Association President is entitled to union leave under Article VI(G) of the 
agreement, which states: 
The District shall continue its practice of permitting the 
Association President to attend union conferences and 
programs, up to a maximum of six (6) days a year. In the 
discretion of the Superintendent, additional time may be 
approved.4 
2
 Stipulation of Facts, Exhibit A, pp. 8-11. 
3
 Stipulation of Facts, Exhibit A, pp. 8-9. 
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The District is a participating school district of the Health Plan, a multi-employer 
municipal cooperative health plan established under the Insurance Law. 
Article XXI of the parties' agreement expressly references the Health Plan. 
Article XXI(A) states: 
The Board of Education agrees to provide medical coverage 
(East End Health Plan) for a period of four (4) years to all 
affected employees, (those bargaining unit members hired 
prior to the date of the memorandum of agreement, August 
28, 1996), retirees and their dependents. The Board of 
Education shall incur full costs of the program for all 
employees and their dependents. Both parties shall adhere 
to all requirements and benefits developed by the Plan. 
In the event the parties choose not to continue in the "Plan" 
at the conclusion of four (4) years, or the "Plan" ceases to 
exist, all necessary steps will be taken to re-enter the Empire 
Plan unless the parties agree to other forms of health 
coverage.5 
The Health Plan is subject to the East End Health Plan Trust Agreement (Trust 
Agreement), which became effective on January 1, 1991. The Health Plan is governed 
by a Board of Trustees, which is composed of individuals in the following categories 
from participating school districts: three Board of Education members, each from 
different school districts; two Superintendents of Schools; one BOCES I, Suffolk 
representative; four teacher members, each from different school districts; one civil 
service employee, and one non-Central Office Administrator.6 All qualified individuals in 
participating school districts may run for an ejected trustee position in their respective 
category. However, only one trustee in each category can be from the same school 
5
 Stipulation of Facts, Exhibit A, p. 15. 
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district, and a participating school district is limited to two representatives. Although the 
District is a participating district, it does not have a representative on the Board of 
Trustees. 
Frank Emmett (Emmett) is a District teacher and the Association President.7 
Since September 2000, Emmett has been an employee representative on the Board of 
Trustees and has attended its quarterly meetings in that capacity. During his tenure on 
the Board of Trustees, Emmett has been permitted by the District to attend the quarterly 
meetings without utilizing personal or any other form of leave under the terms of the 
agreement. 
On or about September 1, 2010, the District advised Emmett that he would be 
required to utilize personal leave when attending quarterly meetings of the Board of 
Trustees. In order to attend the September 15, 2010 Board meeting, Emmett elected to 
take the day without pay rather than utilizing personal leave, which the District had 
made available to him. 
DISCUSSION 
When parties have negotiated an agreement with respect to a specific subject, 
an employer may unilaterally end a past practice without violating the Act by reverting to 
the terms of that specifically negotiated provision of the agreement.8 After satisfying 
the duty to negotiate a particular subject, a respondent cannot be found to have acted 
7
 According to the Association's exceptions, Emmett did not become.an Association 
representative until 2003, a factual assertion that is not supported by the stipulated 
record. Association Exception No. 4. 
"Village of Mount Kisco, 43 PERB H3029 (2010); NYCTA, 42 PERB 1J3012 (2009); Bd 
ofEduc of the City Sch Dist of the City of New York, 42 PERB P019 (2009); NYCTA, 
n Case No. U-30525 -6 
unilaterally in violation of the Act, when its actions are permitted under the terms of the 
negotiated agreement.9 
The burden rests with the respondent to plead and prove a contract reversion or 
duty satisfaction defense through negotiated terms that are reasonably clear on the 
specific subject at issue.10 By definition, a determination with respect to either defense 
requires us to interpret the meaning of the agreement through the application of 
standard principles of contract interpretation. If the language of an agreement is 
reasonably clear but susceptible to more than one interpretation, we will consider 
extrinsic evidence in determining the intent of the parties.11 
Although the Health Plan is explicitly referenced in Article XXI of the parties' 
( ) agreement, the agreement is silent concerning membership or participation on the 
Board of Trustees by the District Superintendent, Board of Education members, or 
Association unit members. Nor does Article XXI contain a leave provision concerning 
attendance by Association unit members at the quarterly meetings of the Board of 
Trustees. 
The ALJ concluded, however, that the District has a right under the Act to revert 
to Article XVII(B) of the agreement on the ground that attendance at meetings of the 
Board of Trustees is an activity that falls within the contractual definition of "personal 
business" for use of personal leave. We disagree. 
9
 Niagara Frontier Transit Metro System, Inc., 42 PERB 1J3023 (2009); County of 
Greene and Sheriff of Greene County, 42 PERB t[3031 (2009). 
^ J 10 NYCTA, supra note 8; NYCTA, 20 PERB 1J3037 (1987), confirmed, NYCTA v New 
York State Pub EmpI Rel Bd, 147 AD2d 574, 22 PERB 1J7001 (2d Dept 1989); Town of 
Shawangunk, 32 PERB P042 (1999). 
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Following our review of the applicable provision, we conclude that the agreement 
is not reasonably clear that the parties intended that attendance at quarterly meetings 
of the Board of Trustees by a unit member as a trustee be an activity that constitutes 
"personal business" under the agreement. Pursuant to Article XVI 1(B) of the 
agreement, Association unit members are entitled to a minimum of 15 sick days and 2 
personal days per annum. Those two forms of accumulated leave can be used for one 
of three specifically defined purposes, under the agreement: sickness; personal • 
business and medical treatment. The parties define the phrases "personal business" 
and "medical treatment" in an identical manner: "an activity which cannot be 
accomplished on a non-working day or during non-working hours." The parties' 
utilization of the same definition for both phrases demonstrates that the definition alone 
is insufficient to demonstrate that attendance at meetings of the Board of Trustees 
constitutes "personal business" covered by Article XVII(B). In addition, in order for a 
unit member to have sufficient leave time to attend the quarterly meetings, he or she 
would have to supplement the 2 personal days with 2 sick days or be granted additional 
personal days at the Superintendent's discretion. 
At best, the agreement is ambiguous concerning the at-issue subject, warranting 
our consideration of extrinsic evidence in the stipulated record. The extrinsic evidence 
is comprised of the 2000 and 2002 amendments to the Trust Agreement describing the 
composition of the Board of Trustees and the applicable selection procedures for 
membership on that governing board. The extrinsic evidence also includes the 
stipulated facts. 
Read together, the extrinsic evidence reveals that Emmett's membership and 
Case No. U-30525 -8-
multi-employer municipal cooperative healthplan. While Emmett is not a 
representative of the District, as a trustee he functions in a fiduciary capacity to, inter 
alia, the District and other participating school districts in the management, control and 
administration of the Health Plan. Indeed, his fiduciary activities and responsibilities are 
equivalent to those of the three Board of Education members and the two 
Superintendents of Schools who are also trustees. Under these facts and 
circumstances, Emmett's attendance at the Board of Trustees cannot be construed as 
a personal activity or as a subject already covered under Article XVII(B) of the 
agreement.12 
Based upon the foregoing, we reverse the ALJ's conclusion that the District did 
not violate §209-a.1(d) of the Act on the bases of its contract reversion and duty 
satisfaction defenses. 
Finally, we deny the Association's exception challenging what it claims is the 
ALJ's conclusion that a unit member may be eligible to utilize union leave to attend 
Board of Trustees' meetings. In fact, the ALJ found that the agreement did not include 
"any provision for release time in furtherance of Association business."13 While Article 
VI(G) of the agreement demonstrates that the ALJ's statement is erroneous, the error is 
not a basis for disturbing the decision. Article VI(G) of the agreement did not form the 
basis for the District's contract reversion and duty satisfaction defenses, or the ALJ's 
decision, and the District has not filed cross-exceptions to the ALJ's decision. 
12
 The ALJ's reliance upon Florida Union Free Sen Dist, 31 PER'B 1J3056 (1998), is 
misplaced. Unlike the present case, the particular contract provision in that case was 
found to encompass daily coffee breaks. 
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Therefore, the possible applicability of Article VI(G) of the agreement to the District's 
defenses is waived.14 Finally, the record does not support the conclusion that Emmett 
was an Association representative on the Board of Trustees. 
Based upon the foregoing, we reverse the ALJ's decision and conclude that the 
District violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act when it unilaterally discontinued the past .practice 
of compensating Emmett for attending, as a trustee, the quarterly meetings of the 
Board of Trustees of the Health Plan without charging personal leave under the 
agreement. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District: 
1. Cease and desist from discontinuing the practice of compensating an 
Association unit member for attending the quarterly meetings of the Board of 
Trustees of the East End Health Plan as a trustee without having to charge 
accumulated leave under the terms of the collectively negotiated agreement; 
2. Compensate Frank Emmett and/or make him whole for any loss of pay or 
benefits for attending, as a trustee, the September 15, 2010 meeting of the 
Board of Trustees of the East End Health Plan and any subsequent quarterly 
meetings of such Board of Trustees, with interest at the maximum legal rate; 
3. Sign, post and distribute the attached notice in all locations normally used to 
14
 Section 213.2(b)(4) of the Rules of Procedure; Town of Orangetown, 40 PERB 1J3008 
(2007), confirmed, Town of Orangetown v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 40 PERB 
1T7008 (Sup Ct Albany County 2007). 
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communicate both in writing and electronically with Association unit 
employees. 
DATED:. August 6, 2012 
Albany, New York 
Sheila S. Cole, Member 
NUI ICb IUALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Shelter Island Union Free School District, in the unit 
represented by Shelter Island Faculty Association, NYSUT, AFT, NEA, AFL-CIO, that the District 
will: 
1. Reinstate the practice of compensating an Association unit member for 
attending, the quarterly meetings of the Board of Trustees of the East End 
Health Plan as a trustee without having to charge accumulated leave under 
the collectively negotiated agreement; 
2. Compensate Frank Emmett and/or make him whole for any loss of pay or 
benefits for attending, as a trustee, the September 15, 2010 meeting of the 
Board of Trustees of the East End Health Plan and any subsequent quarterly 
meetings of such Board of Trustees. 
Dated By 
On behalf of the Shelter Island Union 
Free School District 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ANTHONY FALSO, 
Charging Party, CASE NO. U-31025 
- and -
ROCHESTER TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent, 
- and -
ROCHESTER CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
ANTHONY FALSO, pro se 
RICHARD E. CASAGRANDE, GENERAL COUNSEL (HAROLD EISENSTEIN 
of counsel), for Respondent 
CHARLES G. JOHNSON, GENERAL COUNSEL (BETHANY A. CENTRONE 
of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Anthony Falso (Falso) to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing an improper practice charge, 
filed on May 5, 2011, alleging that the Rochester Teachers Association (Association) 
violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). The charge was 
dismissed based upon the ALJ's conclusion that the charge, as supplemented and 
modified by Falso's offer of proof, failed to allege sufficient facts, which if proven, would 
demonstrate that the Association violated §209-a.2(c) of the Act.1 
In his exceptions, Falsb asserts four bases for reversing the ALJ's decision. His 
first exception asserts that his allegations concerning the private attorney retained by the 
Association to evaluate the merits of his 2007 grievance are sufficient to set forth a claim 
of a violation of §209-a.2(c) of the Act against the Association. He also asserts that the 
Association's alleged failure to respond to his workplace complaints in 2006 and 2007 and 
to keep him properly informed about the processing of his grievance prior to 2011 state a 
claim under §209-a.2(c) of the Act. Finally, he claims that the ALJ's decision should be 
overturned on the grounds that he was denied pre-hearing discovery and an evidentiary 
hearing. The Association supports the ALJ's decision. 
Following our review of the exceptions, the Association's response, and the record, 
we affirm the decision of the ALJ dismissing the charge. 
FACTS 
For purposes of determining Falso's exceptions, we consider the undisputed facts 
set forth in the ALJ's letter to the parties dated August 26, 2011, and assume the truth of 
the allegations in the charge and offer of proof as they relate to the specifics of the 
exceptions.2 
Falso was employed as a per diem substitute teacher by the Rochester City School 
1
 45 PERB H4509 (2012). Pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Act, the Rochester City School 
District is named as a statutory party. 
2
 County of Livingston, 43 PERB 1J3018 (2010); Bd of Educ of the City Sch Dist of the City 
of New York (Grassel), 43 PERB P010 (2010); Niagara Frontier Transit Metro System, 
Inc., 42 PERB 1J3023 (2009). 
District (District) for the period May 2006-November 2007. During his tenure, the District 
received complaints from five District schools about his mismanagement of assigned 
classrooms and other related problems concerning his job performance. Falso responded 
to each written complaint with a letter to the District. He also contacted the Association 
President about each complaint, but she failed to take any action on his behalf. 
On October 19, 2007, the District notified Falso that he was being permanently 
removed from the District's roster of per diem substitute teachers. Following a meeting 
between Falso and Association representatives, the Association filed a grievance on 
behalf of Falso challenging the District's adverse action. The Association processed the 
grievance to Step 3 and advocated on Falso's.behalf at a grievance hearing. 
The Association sent a memorandum to Falso dated October 9, 2008, informing 
him that at a mediation session between the Association and the District concerning the 
grievance, a mediator advised the parties that the District acted properly in removing Falso 
from the per diem substitute teacher roster. Thereafter, the Association retained a private 
attorney to recommend whether the Association should process Falso's grievance to 
arbitration. 
Pursuant to the Association's request, the attorney reviewed the grievance, Falso's 
work history, the relevant provision of the collectively negotiated agreement between the 
District and the Association, and he interviewed Falso. On January 17, 2011, the attorney 
sent the Association a letter setting forth the results of his review and his conclusions. 
The attorney recommended that the Association decline to process the grievance to 
arbitration based upon the following: the documented work performance issues during 
Falso's short tenure with the District; the attorney's impressionistic evaluation of Falso's 
attitude concerning those complaints; and the ambiguity in the applicable contract 
language. 
The Association notified Falso by a letter dated January 28, 2011, that it would not 
be processing his grievance to arbitration based upon the analysis and recommendation 
of the attorney retained by the Association. In addition, the Association's letter stated that 
it would not be responsible for attorneys' fees incurred by Falso in his federal 
discrimination lawsuit against the District concerning his removal from the per diem 
substitute roster.3 
DISCUSSION 
We begin with Falso's procedural arguments concerning pre-hearing disclosure and 
the dismissal of his charge without an evidentiary hearing. 
Pursuant to State Administrative Procedure Act §305, an administrative agency has 
the authority to adopt procedural rules permitting pre-hearing discovery. Our Rules of 
Procedure (Rules), however, do not include procedures for pre-hearing discovery in the 
processing of an improper practice charge. Therefore, Falso's argument that the ALJ 
should have permitted him to conduct discovery concerning his charge lacks any merit.4 
We also reject Falso's claim that the dismissal of the charge without an evidentiary 
hearing violates State Administrative Procedure Act §301. The record demonstrates that 
3
 On March 31, 2011, United States District Court Judge David G. Larimer issued a 
decision granting summary judgment to the District concerning Falso's federal action 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which claimed that the District removed him 
from the per diem substitute register because of Falso's Italian-American ancestry. See, 
Falso v Rochester City Sch Dist, 09-CV-6651L (WDNY 2011). 
4
 See, Heimv Regan, 90 AD2d 656 (3d Dept 1982). 
Falso had a full and fair opportunity to set forth any facts in dispute between the parties 
and to make legal and factual arguments, including submitting an offer of proof identifying 
evidence that he erroneously asserts would demonstrate that the Association violated 
§209-a.2(c)oftheAct. 
The exceptions with respect to the substance of the charge are equally without 
merit. Falso failed to articulate sufficient and relevant factual allegations in his offer of 
proof, which, if proven, would demonstrate that the Association acted in a manner that 
was arbitrary, discriminatory, or was motivated by bad faith when it refused to process his 
grievance to arbitration.5 
An employee organization is not obligated under the Act to take every grievance to 
arbitration.6 It is entitled to a broad range of discretion in determining whether a particular 
grievance should be taken to arbitration, and we will not substitute our judgment 
concerning the merits of that grievance.7 In particular, we will not second-guess an 
employee organization's decision concerning the processing of a grievance when the 
decision was made based upon a professional disinterested review and recommendation 
of an attorney retained or employed by the employee organization.8 
In the present case, the Association retained a private attorney to conduct a 
5
 Board of Education of the City Sch Distpfthe City of New York and UFT (Zarinfar), 44 
PERB P012 (2011). 
6
 New York State Public Employees Fedn (Frisch), 29 PERB p 0 1 9 (1996). 
7
 Rochester Teachers Assn (Danna), 41 PERB P003 (2008); UFT (Morrell), 44 PERB 
113030(2011). 
8
 DC 37 (Maltsev), 41 PERB 1J3022 (2008). 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
n — ~ 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE NURSES ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, CASE NO. U-30579 
- and -
COUNTY OF ERIE and ERIE COUNTY MEDICAL 
CENTER CORPORATION, 
Respondent. 
SPIVAK LIPTON LLP (DENIS P. DUFFEY, JR. and ADRIAN HEALY, ESQ., of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
CHRISTOPHER M. PUTRINO, ESQ., for Respondent County of Erie 
COLUCCI & GALLAHER, PC (KATHRYN A. LISANDRELLI and PAUL. G. 
JOYCE, ESQ., of counsel), for Respondent Erie County Medical Center 
i ) Corporation 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to the Board on exceptions filed by Respondent Erie County 
Medical Center Corporation (ECMCC) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ)1 finding that the County of Erie (County) and ECMCC, as a joint employer, 
violated §209-a.1(d)of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by refusing to 
provide certain information sought by the New York State Nurses Association (NYSNA) 
for the purposes of investigating and processing grievances related to acts of workplace 
violence.2 
1
 44 PERB H4597(2011). 
2
 The County and ECMCC constitute a statutorily created joint employer pursuant to 
~) Pub7\uth Law §3629. See, County of Erie, 44 PERB"1J3027 (2011). See also, County 
of Erie and ECMCC, 42 PERB 1J4511 (2009), affd, 43 PERB fl3008 (2010), n.2. 
Nevertheless, only ECMCC has filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision in the present 
In Hampton Bays Union Free School District,3 we reaffirmed a basic principle 
under the Act: an employee organization has a general right to receive documents and 
information, requested from an employer, for use jn investigating a potential grievance, 
and/or the processing of a pending grievance.4 This general right is subject to three 
primary limitations: reasonableness, relevancy and necessity. In addition, we have 
concluded that prior to refusing to disclose information under the Act based upon a 
claim of confidentiality, a respondent is obligated to first engage in good faith 
negotiations for the purpose of reaching an agreed-upon accommodation concerning 
the requested information.5 
In its exceptions, ECMCC advances various reasons to justify the withholding of 
the documents sought by NYSNA. 
First, it contends that NYSNA is not entitled to the requested documents 
concerning a July 2010 workplace violence incident during which a non-unit security ^  
guard was injured in the presence of NYSNA-represented unit members. According to 
ECMCC, NYSNA has not sufficiently demonstrated the reasonableness, relevancy and 
necessity for this information. We disagree. 
Section 19.06 of the parties' collectively negotiated agreement (agreement) 
3
 41 PERB 1J3008 (2008J confirmed sub nom. Hampton Bays Union Free Sch Dist v 
New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 62 AD3d 1066, 42 PERB 1J7005 (3d Dept 2009), Iv 
den, 13 NY3d 711, 42. PERB 1J7009 (2009). 
4
 See also, County of Erie and Erie County Sheriff, 36 PERB p 0 2 1 (2003), confirmed 
sub nom. County of Erie and Erie County Sheriff v State of New York, 14 AD3d 14, 37 
PERB U7008 (3d Dept 2004); Town of Evans, 37 PERB 1J3016 (2004); State of New 
York (OMRDD), 38'PERB P036 (2005), confirmed sub nom. CSEA v New York State 
Pub Empl Rel Bd, 14 Misc3d 199, 39 PERB Tf7009 (2006), affd, 46 AD3d 1037, 40 
PERB TJ7009 (3d Dept 2007). 
5
 Hampton Bays Union Free Sch Dist, supra note 3. See also, Nanuet Union Free Sch 
Dist, 45 PERB 1J3007, n.15 (2012). 
states that: 
The County will observe all applicable health and safety laws 
and regulations. The County will take all steps practical to 
protect employee health and safety. 
Among the applicable health and safety laws is Labor Law §27-b, which 
mandates public employers to create and implement workplace violence protection 
programs aimed at preventing and minimizing workplace assaults and homicides. 
Based upon the breadth of §19.06 of the agreement, the pendency of numerous 
class action and individual workplace violence and safety grievances under the contract 
provision, and the record of alleged workplace assaults on NYSNA unit members, we 
reject ECMCC's contention that it was not obligated to provide the requested 
information concerning the July 2010 incident. The documents are relevant to NYSNA 
for determining whether the County and ECMCC are complying with the agreement by 
taking all practical measures to protect the health and safety of unit members in the 
area of the July 2010 assault. The facts that a non-unit employee was injured during 
the incident and NYSNA may be able to interview unit members who were present at 
the scene are not legitimate grounds for refusing to provide the requested information 
concerning compliance with §19.06 of the agreement. Furthermore, the record does 
not support ECMCC's claim that the presence of a NYSNA representative at meetings 
of the Psych Task Force Committee satisfies NYSNA's need for information to 
administer the provisions of §19.06 of the agreement. 
In its second exception, ECMCC asserts that the ALJ erred in directing that the 
County and ECMCC provide NYSNA with copies of reports of workplace violence for 
the period 2007 through August 20, 2010. According to ECMCC, the ALJ should have 
limited the scope of NYSNA's request to specific incidents already known to NYSNA. In 
addition, ECMCC asserts that compliance with the remedial order would be unduly 
burdensome because it would require a search of paper and electronic records for 
reports related to violence-related injuries. In light of the targeted nature of NYSNA's 
request and the arguable relevance of the information for investigating and prosecuting 
workplace violence grievances under §19.06 of the agreement, we do not find the 
scope of the information request to be overbroad. Furthermore, we are not persuaded 
under the facts and circumstances before us that the search for and the redaction of 
the relevant records would be overly burdensome.6 
ECMCC also claims in its exceptions that documents sought by NYSNA might 
include protected health information under the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA),7 which prohibits release of such confidential information. 
HIPAA, however, permits disclosure of de-identified protected health information,8 and 
NYSNA has already consented to the redaction of all patient and staff identifying 
information. There is no evidence in the record that the County and ECMCC engaged 
in good faith negotiations with NYSNA aimed at reaching a voluntary accommodation 
concerning the joint employer's continued confidentiality concerns under HIPAA.9 
Finally, we reject ECMCC's exception premised upon Education Law §6527, 
which prohibits the release of medical records in certain circumstances. In pertinent 
part, Education Law §6527 states: 
6
 ECMCC's reliance upon our decision in State of New York-Unified Court System, 41 
PERB 1J3009 (2008), vacated, Pfau v New York State Pub EmpI Rel Bd, 24 Misc3d 260, 
42 PERB H7003 (Sup Ct, Albany County 2009), affd, 69 AD3d 1080 43 PERB 1J7001 
(3d Dept 2010), is misplaced. In that case, we found a demand seeking copies of all 
documents "including, without limitation, any memoranda between or among agents of 
the employer" referring or relating to an employee's alleged behavior to be overbroad. 
7
 Pub L No 104-191, 110 Stat 1936 (1996). 
8
 See, 45 CFR §§164.502 and 164.514. 
Neither the proceedings nor the records relating to 
performance of a medical or a quality assurance review 
function or participation in a medical and dental malpractice 
prevention program nor any report required by the 
department of health pursuant to section twenty-eight 
hundred five-1 of the public health law described herein, 
including the investigation of an incident reported pursuant 
to section 29.29 of the mental hygiene law, shall be subject 
to disclosure under article thirty-One of the civil practice law 
and rules except as hereinafter provided or as provided by 
any other provision of law. (Emphasis added.) 
In Civil Service Employees Association, Inc, v New York State Public 
Employment Relations Board,™ the Appellate Division, Third Department held that 
Education Law §6527 is inapplicable to the release of documents in response to a 
demand for information made by an employee organization, pursuant to §209-a.1(d) of 
the Act, in furtherance of its duty to represent a member.11 As a result, we find no merit 
to ECMCC's reliance upon Education Law §6527 in the present case. 
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the decision of the ALJ finding that the 
County and ECMC.C have violated §209-a. 1 (d) of the Act. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County and ECMCC provide NYSNA, 
subject to redaction of patient and staff identifying information, with the following: 
(1) Information as to any investigation which was performed with regard to 
the July 2010 incident in which a security guard was injured, including any 
notes, statements and the conclusion of such an investigation, if 
performed; 
(2) Copies of reports of violence documented in OMH 147 Incident Reports 
and OMH 174 A Examination Sheets, or alternately documented 
electronically through NIMRS or otherwise, that are related to violence 
from 2007 through August 20, 2010; 
lu
 Supra note 4. 
11
 See also, Mental Hygiene Legal Serv v Maul, 36 AD3d 1133 (3d Dept 2007), iv 
denied, 8 NY3d 812(2007). 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the County of Erie and Erie County Medical 
Center Corporation (ECMCC) in the unit represented by the New York State 
Nurses Association (NYSNA), that the County of Erie and ECMCC will provide 
forthwith to NYSNA, the following: 
1. Information as to any investigation which was performed with regard to 
the July 2010 incident in which a security guard was injured, including any 
notes, statements and the conclusion of such an investigation, if 
performed; 
2. Copies of reports of violence documented in OMH 147 Incident 
Reports and OMH 174 A Examination Sheets, or alternately documented 
electronically through NIMRS or otherwise, that are related to violence 
from 2007 through August 20, 2010; and 
3. Copies of reports of any act of violence recorded in the Quantrose 
system from 2007 to August 20, 2010. 
Dated By 
on behalf of the County of Erie and 
Erie County Medical Center Corporation 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ITHACA POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
INC., 
Charging Party, 
CASENO.U-31665 
- and -
CITY OF ITHACA, 
Respondent. 
MARILYN D. BERSON, ESQ., for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to the Board, on exceptions filed by the Ithaca Police 
Benevolent Association, Inc. (Association) to a decision of the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing a charge, as amended, 
filed by the Association alleging that the City of Ithaca (City) violated §209-a.1(d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it ended a past practice of 
assigning light or modified duty to Association unit members, at their request, after they 
returned to work from contractual sick leave due to an off-duty injury or illness.1 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Following the filing of the original charge, the Director sent a letter to the 
Association stating that the charge is deficient because the City's "decision whether to 
offer a return to light duty appears nonmandatory. It is not procedural." In response to 
1
 45 PERB jf4547(2012). 
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the deficiency notice, the Association filed an amended charge, which alleged the 
following: 
Returning to work from sick leave is a term and condition of 
employment within the meaning of the Act and mandatorily 
negotiable as such. The practice of allowing employees at 
their request to return to work from sick leave is inherently a 
substantive benefit that is economic in nature. A return to 
work at an employee's request avoids the dissipation of 
accrued, paid sick leave, opens the employee to overtime 
opportunities and affords them every other thing of value 
that comes from an employee's presence at work (e.g. 
training opportunities, preferred assignment opportunities, 
promotional opportunities) all of which are negatively 
affected by job absence. 
Following receipt of the amendment, the Director issued his decision dismissing 
the charge, as deficient, on the ground that the assignment of light duty constitutes a 
) managerial prerogative unless the assignment falls outside the essential duties and 
functions of an employee's position. In reaching his decision, the Director relied upon 
our decision in Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority.2 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the Association asserts that the Director erred in dismissing 
the charge during his initial review on the grounds that he failed to apply the appropriate 
standard to its pleading, and deprived the Association of an opportunity to provide 
additional information in support of the charge, during a pre-hearing conference and 
hearing. Furthermore, the Association contends that its charge is not deficient as a 
matter of law because the subject of the charge is a unilateral termination of a disability 
benefit plan covering off-duty injuries and illnesses. 
2
 32 PERB 1J3078 (1999). See also, Town of Oyster Bay, 12 PERB P086 (1979); 
Waverlv Cent Sch Dist 10 PERB 113103 (1977). 
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Based upon our review of the Association's exceptions, we reverse the Director's 
decision. 
DISCUSSION 
Pursuant to §204.1 (a)(3) of the Rules of Procedure (Rules), a charging party is 
obligated to set forth a clear and concise statement of facts that it claims constitutes an 
alleged improper practice under §209-a of the Act. After a charge is filed, the Director 
is required by §204.2(a) of the Rules to review and weed out facially deficient charges 
that fail to allege facts that, as a matter of law, might constitute a violation of §209-a of 
the Act.3 The Director's review and dismissal of deficient charges constitutes an 
important administrative function because it helps avoid unnecessary conferences and 
hearings. In determining whether an improper practice charge sets forth a claim under 
an acceptable or recognizable legal theory, the charging party is entitled to all 
reasonable inferences from the facts alleged.4 
Contrary to the Association's suggestion, a charging party is not entitled to have 
a charge processed to a pre-hearing conference or hearing when the charge is facially 
deficient under §204.2(a) of the Rules. Our administrative improper practice 
procedures were never intended to guarantee parties an administrative forum for 
facially nonmeritorious or untimely claims. In fact, even after a charge is processed 
following the Director's initial review, the charge may be dismissed by an Administrative 
3
 MABSTOA, 40 PERB 1J3023 (2007). 
4
 City of Yonkers, 23 PERB 1J3055 (1990); State of New York (Office of Mental Health), 
24 PERB U3004 (199.1); Dutchess Comm Coll, 41 PERB P029 (2008); State of New 
York (Department of Correctional Services), 42 PERB 1J3Q14 (2009). 
